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Abstract
To consider the implication of disaggregated consumption and discount-
ing, we study discounting in a world composed of the rich and the poor, a
standard setting in the literature of cost-benefit analysis with distributional
considerations. We derive several discount rates for different nume´raires,
which would enable us to discuss intergenerational and intragenerational
equity in common terms. In the example of CES-CRRA utility, we also
show that disaggregated discount rates may vary owing to several factors.
One important parameter of such –inequality aversion– can be determined
in unknown weighting of intergenerational and intragenerational concerns.
Key Words: Discounting; income distribution; climate change; environmen-
tal stock
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1 Introduction
In the series of reports published by IPCC over the past decade, one of the most
controversial socioeconomic factor has been the choice of discount factor for mea-
suring costs and benefits of future climate change, which was especially evident in
Second Assessment Report of 1995. Similarly, right after the launch of the Stern
Review, most criticisms (and plaudits) referred to its choice of low utility discount
rate that could have led to the opposite conclusion were it higher.
Standard analysis suggests that the consumption discount rate is made up of
pure rate of time preference and the product of consumption growth rate and
the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. But the rate of “consumption
growth” seems too aggregate to discuss such a global and durable issue, so some
authors scrutinize the prospect of consumption, along the line of the limited sub-
stitutability argument of Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2002). In such a move, Hoel
and Sterner (2007) and Traeger (2011) assume consumption of usual commodi-
ties and environmental quality as arguments of utility. Assigning relative prices
to both consumption and the environment, they show that when discounting the
environment the possible increase of the relative price of the environment should
be deducted from the usual consumption discount rate. Applying this formulation
to the DICE model of Nordhaus (2008) would propose the optimal emission of
carbon dioxide become zero within a century (Sterner and Persson 2008).
Aside from the relatively oft-debated issue of uncertain consumption, another
route that can be taken to elaborate the consumption prospect is to disaggregate
consumption into the rich and the poor. Equity consideration in cost-benefit analy-
sis dates back at least to Dasgupta et al.’s (1972) exposition which proposed some
unknown redistributional weight be placed on the poor’s consumption. Since then,
however, equity weighting has been almost evicted from standard analysis under
the banner of Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion, but it has recently been mak-
ing a comeback in the context of climate change. An obvious reason is that it
is very costly or unrealistic to compensate those who suffer positive net damage
from climate change in the present and in the future. A pioneering study in this
regard is Azar and Sterner (1996) again and Fankhauser et al. (1997), who have
considered weighting costs and benefits by the elasticity of marginal utility of in-
come1. Kaplow and Weisbach (2011) clarify that the elasticity of marginal utility
is essentially a reduced form derived from the composite of the utility function
1Their nume´raires were marginal utility of the rich and the average, respectively, but they were
shown to be equivalence process by Azar (1999).
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and the social welfare function.
In debates about climate change, unarguably one of the most contentious prac-
tical problems of equity consideration, it is sometimes suggested that enhancing
adaptive behavior of the vulnerable should be prioritized over costly, uncertain
mitigative policies by the rich countries. For example, referring to the relation be-
tween the two policies as “trade-offs,” Tol (2005) suggests that reducing impacts
might be more efficient than reducing emissions in Africa and Latin America2.
In this context also, discounting based on disaggregated consumption could be of
more significance if we pose the problem as mitigation versus adaptation, each
affecting the rich and the poor in a different manner.
All these explain the motivation of the current paper. Quite a few papers have
accumulated regarding the substitutability and the equity consideration, but few
studies focus on their combination, albeit its apparent relevance in the policy de-
bate. If we disaggregate consumption into the rich and the poor, while keeping
the dual consumption of the composite good and the environment, we get a more
precise idea of what is going on in terms of the discount rate. In the course of
doing so, we start with a general social welfare function (SWF), and gradually
proceed while clarifying several formulations of social discount rates. By intro-
ducing income groups and the environment in a social welfare function, we will
find how population change, time preference rates in each group, utility growth,
the self-elasticity of consumption and cross elasticity of consumption and the en-
vironment all help to determine the discount rates. Specifically, the combination
of inequality aversion, relative risk aversion, and the cross elasticity of marginal
utility is shown to yield interesting diversion between the income groups in the
simulation results. This two-good, two-country model highlights the problem of
applying “one-size-fits-all” discount rate in the global warming discussion in the
current world3. Also, the discount rate for the environment nume´raire now in-
cludes the “welfare value share” of each income group. Furthermore, it would
clarify the oft-debated balancing act of intergenerational equity and intragenera-
tional equity (Schelling 1995; Portney and Weyant 1999; Lo´pez 2005), by directly
comparing the welfare of people in a different land, living in different times.
In the next section, we study a general SWF and state some remarks on sev-
eral discount rates. Section 3 introduces a CES-CRRA utility function which is
dependent on both consumption and the environmental stock. In Section 4, we
2See also Lomborg (2008) for a similar non-technical argument.
3In a related vein, a recent paper by Anthoff and Tol (2010) calculates different social costs of
carbon according to different social welfare functions.
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explore an intertemporal version of unknown equity weighting, which can be ap-
plied practically to study the significance of inequality aversion discussed in the
preceding sections. Section 5 concludes.
2 General Formulation
We would like to consider a general SWF, which go beyond the dichotomy of
either a utilitarian or Rawlsian. Indeed, as Pearce (2003) put it, distributional
weights raise the problem that “any number of social welfare functions (SWFs)
can be postulated, each producing different weightings”, so we start with a for-
mulation as general as possible, following Azar (1999) and Johansson-Stenman
(2000, 2005). We assume that the world is divided between the rich and the poor.
Our “welfaristic” social welfare function is inherently an intertemporal one, and
differs from a representative agent utility:
W =
∫
∞
0
w(ur(t), up(t), t)dt, (1)
where w is an instantaneous Bergson-Samuelson welfare valued at the present
term, ur(t) and up(t) represent utility for an individual in the rich and the poor
world, respectively. We extend this expression by defining the instantaneous wel-
fare (Fankhauser et al. 1997):
W =
∫
∞
0
1
1 − α
[Lru(1−α)r e−δrt + Lpu(1−α)p e−δpt] dt, α , 1, (2)
where Lr and Lp stand for the populations in the rich and the poor, assumed
to be exogenously determined. This type is sometimes called constant inequal-
ity aversion, or constant equality aversion, depending on the value of α (i.e.
−wuuu/wu = α, where the subscript i is omitted).
Note also that the time preference rates, δr of the rich and δp of the poor, can
differ from each other in the above setting. Utility discount rate, or social rate of
time preference, should be firmly founded from an ethical point of view. Then
discounting utility at a different rate might appear an erroneous move. That said,
different rates of utility discount can not be so much of a cardinal sin for some
reasons. The rate, also reflecting people’s rate of impatience, can differ in each in-
come group. If those in each group reach a consensus on the group’s discount rate,
which then turn out to be different from the other group, different rates of utility
discount should be accepted. Indeed, this is loosely similar to the formulation of
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Li and Lo¨fgren (2000), who considered a world of two persons, one conservation-
ist and the other utilitarian. In such a setting, the conservationist’s view is more
and more weighted as time passes. Also, while human being as a whole is on the
same boat called the Earth, one may consider one group’s possibility of extinc-
tion is higher than the other. After all, if we heuristically find that this cannot be
permissible, then we can simply give it up and set δr = δp.
As for the utility, we briefly note here that it is dependent on per capita con-
sumption, Ci/Li, and the environment, namely,
ui = u(Ci/Li, E), for i = p, r, (3)
where ∂ui/∂ci > 0, ∂ui/∂E > 0, ∂2ui/∂c2i < 0, and ∂2ui/∂E2 < 0, but the sign of
∂2ui/∂ci∂E is ambiguous. Here E stands for an aggregate proxy for the environ-
ment, typically a global ecosystem or a global sink for atmospheric concentration
of carbon dioxide. E does not come with a suffix for the income category as it
stands for a global public good, but the consequences of a perturbation in it can be
widely different, so that it may be that those in each group have different prefer-
ences toward E. It is also important to note that we abstract away from inequality
within each group.
Now let us define a discount rate as the rate of change of the shadow price
of the object in question. For example, the shadow price of per capita utility at t
is ∂w/∂ui = Liu−αi e−δit for i = p, r, so that i’s per capita utility discount rate ρ
pcu
i
becomes
ρ
pcu
i = −
d
dt
∂w
∂ui(t) =
−∂2w/∂ui∂t
∂w/∂ui
+
−ui∂
2w/∂u2i
∂w/∂ui
u˙i
ui
= δi −
˙Li
Li
+ α
u˙i
ui
, for i = p, r.
(4)
In the literature it is common to refer to the pure rate of time preference δi as the
utility discount rate, but it is clear from the above expression that it holds only
under utilitarianism. When the nume´raire is per capita utility, the latter is equal
to the former, net of the rate of population growth, plus the rate of utility growth
multiplied by the inequality aversion parameter, α. The message is that, for a
developing world where population is increasing at a rate higher than the devel-
oped world, per capita utility discount rate should be smaller. The second term
expresses decreasing marginal welfare of utility, also appearing in the discount
rate in the utility term. For the case of classical utilitarianism, however, one unit
of increase in utility in any region would amount to one unit of social welfare at
that moment, i.e. α = 0, so that the third term disappears. Also, a representative
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agent model assumes constant population by definition, which would nullify the
second term as well.
Likewise, the shadow price of per capita consumption at t is ∂w/∂ci = Liu−αi e−δit∂ui/∂ci
for i = p, r, so we have
ρ
pcc
i = δi −
˙Li
Li
+ α
u˙i
ui
−
d
dt
∂ui
∂ci
∂ui/∂ci
, for i = p, r. (5)
That is, in addition to the per capita utility discount rate ρpcu, we should discount
further for the growth of the derivative of utility with regard to its arguments. If we
consider aggregate consumption, rather than per capita consumption, in a given
group, the second term of the rate of the population change is canceled out.
Now, as we assume that people derive utility from the environment as well as
from consumption, care is taken in developing the last term of the RHS in (5), as
−
d
dt
∂ui
∂ci
∂ui/∂ci
= −
∂2ui
∂c2i
c˙i +
∂2ui
∂ci∂E
˙E
∂ui/∂ci
= ηicc
c˙i
ci
+ ηicE
˙E
E
, for i = p, r, (6)
where ηicc ≡ −uiccci/uic and ηicE ≡ −uicEE/uic In a standard Ramsey model, where
consumption is the only argument of utility, (6) corresponds to the elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption multiplied by the consumption growth rate. When
the environment also affects utility, what should be added to this is the cross elas-
ticity of marginal utility of consumption and the environment, multiplied by the
growth of the environmental stock (e.g. Krautkraemer 1985).
Plugging (6) into the equation (5) for i = p, r, we obtain the difference between
the per capita consumption rate of the rich and that of the poor:
ρpccr − ρ
pcc
p = (δr − δp) −
[ ˙Lr
Lr
−
˙Lp
Lp
]
+ α
[ u˙r
ur
−
u˙p
up
]
+
[
ηrcc
c˙r
cr
− ηpcc
c˙p
cp
]
+ (ηrcE − ηpcE)
˙E
E
.
(7)
In other words, per capita consumption discount rates would be the same value
only when the RHS of (7) becomes zero.
For the cross elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, little is known yet.
But when consumption and the environment are substitutes, ηcE > 0, when com-
plements, ηcE < 0. Heal (2009) argues that it is likely to be negative, and so as-
sume Weikard and Zhu (2005), but things may vary according to income groups.
When people enjoy a high level of average consumption, the environment can be
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perceived as a substitute, so the growth in the environmental good can actually de-
crease the marginal utility of consumption. On the contrary, when the economy is
based on subsistence, or physically and economically vulnerable to environmental
damage, it seems safe to assume consumption and the environment are comple-
ments. The feasibility of formulating such functions is quite another matter, which
is to be explored in the next section.
3 An Example of CES-CRRA Utility
In this section, we further specify the utility function and elaborate on the char-
acteristics of the formulation shown in the previous section. We follow Hoel
and Sterner (2007) in assuming a constant elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption c and the environment E. Also, relative risk aversion is set constant at
β(> 0,, 1). Formally, we have
ui = u(ci, E) = 11 − β [(1 − γ)c
1−1/σ
i + γE
1−1/σ](1−β) σσ−1 for i = p, r, (8)
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the envi-
ronment, and γ is a weight-like constant which is in the range of (0,1). Now we
will have a look at each term in the RHS of (7) by turn.
3.1 Utility discount rate
The utility discount rate is sometimes called the rate of pure time preference, or
the rate of impatience in others. It is considered to be a parameter to be ethically
determined, which is why so controversial. Some authors including Ramsey and
Harrod famously state that it should be set at nil since future generations cannot
be discriminated just because they live in the future, resorting to analogy with the
legitimacy of modern spatial discrimination. Others point out, however, that with
our possibility of our extinction being positive, it should be above zero by nature,
however abysmally low it may be. Also, zero impatience would imply an absurdly
high saving rate in a productive economy (Dasgupta 2008).
The question of relevance to the current debate is: do we have a different
utility discount rate depending on the income level4? Three rationales for differ-
entiation come up immediately. First, when the utility discount rate is seen as
4A survey by Frederick et al. (2002) shows that utility discounting varies among individuals
even within one empirical research.
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the survival probability of individuals, the shorter average lifetime they have, the
higher discount rate they are taken to have. Second, similarly, if the discount rate
is interpreted as the survival probability of rich and poor dynasties, the poorer
group might face larger extinction risk because of their harsh environment. Third,
and most importantly, there is ethical intuition that rationale for utility discounting
is stronger in the case of the rich than for the poor.
For all this, just because different income groups may have different patience
level doesn’t mean different utility discount rates should be applied when we as-
sume a social (world) planner maximizing (2)5. Although we cannot discuss this
issue furthermore in this paper, it seems safer to keep assuming that δr − δp is at
most negligible until we come up with rationale for discrimination.
3.2 Population growth rate
As described above, this term appears only when we are talking about per capita
consumption as nume´raire, while it disappears for the case of the conventional
aggregate consumption discount rate. We simply take it that population growth
rates are exogenously given6. So the message here is simply that there might arise
a wide diversion of per capita consumption discount rates due to the different
prospects of population growth.
3.3 Elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and consump-
tion growth
The product of elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and consumption
growth rate is also revealed in the conventional Ramsey discounting. There is
already a huge discussion on this, although apparently there is no consensus up to
now. The ethical part is the elasticity ηicc, which is usually assumed to fall some-
where in the range of 1 and 4. In the current formulation of utility, it becomes
ηicc = −uiccci/uic = (β −
1
σ
)(1 − φi) + 1
σ
= β(1 − φi) + 1
σ
φi > 0, (9)
where φi ≡ γE
1−1/σ
(1 − γ)c1−1/σi + γE1−1/σ
.
5Furthermore, as time goes to infinity, different pure rates of time difference exhibit problem-
atic consumption paths.
6Endogenous population would raise another deep policy implication, as is noted in Dasgupta
(2008).
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The newly denoted φi can be rewritten as uE E
ucc+uE E
, implying this variable is the
value share of the environment (Hoel and Sterner 2007). Again, our interest lies in
the difference of the elasticity between the rich and the poor. The partial derivative
of the value share of the environment w.r.t. consumption reveals itself as
∂φi
∂ci
= −
γ(1 − γ)(1 − 1/σ)(ci/E)−1/σ/E
[(1 − γ)(ci/E)1−1/σ + γ]2 =

< 0 if σ > 1
> 0 if 0 < σ < 1,
which is to say, when the consumer cuts back on “consumption” of the environ-
ment by σ(> 1)% in responding to a relative price hike of the environment by
1%, the value share of the environment decreases as consumption rises. On the
contrary, if the elasticity of substitution is less than 1%, it decreases. So we have
ηrcc − η
p
cc = −(β −
1
σ
)(φr − φp),
whose sign is dependent upon the sign of φr−φp, as well as upon whether βσ > 1.
When 0 < σ < 1, which is an interesting case for climate change debate, it is
likely that φr > φp, in which case the elasticity of the rich, ηrcc, is smaller (larger)
than that of the poor, ηpcc, if and only if βσ > (<)1.
The portion of consumption growth includes nothing ethical, and it is governed
by consumption prospects written on the wall of scenarios. It is usually considered
to be positive at least for the short- and mid-term, except for some anomalies. Azar
and Sterner (1996) and Dasgupta (2008), among others, consider the possibility
of declining consumption when deriving consumption discount rate, particularly
accounting for the externality of climate change.
3.4 Inequality aversion and utility growth
Our assumption of global social welfare function generates the difference of utility
growth rates weighted by inequality aversion parameter. The case of α = 0 col-
lapses to the usual representative agent utility; in contrast, a Rawlsian would set
the parameter at α = −∞. α is an ethical parameter to address intragenerational
equity between the rich and the poor7. It is hard to allocate a priori a specific
number to this, so it would be safest to conduct sensitivity analysis, or even resort
to unknown weighting (see Section 4).
7As mentioned above, we skip the problem of inequality within each group.
9
The utility growth rate for i can be obtained by taking the time derivative of
(8):
u˙/u = (1 − β) σ
σ − 1
d
dt log[(1 − γ)c
1−1/σ
i + γE
1−1/σ]
= (1 − β)[(1 − φi)c˙i/ci + φi ˙E/E].
(10)
3.5 Environment growth and cross elasticity of marginal utility
of consumption
Whether the environment is complement or substitute of consumption is both the-
oretically and empirically a challenge. In our formulation, however, a straightfor-
ward calculation shown in Hoel and Sterner (2007) leads to the cross elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption
ηicE ≡ −uicEE/uic = (β −
1
σ
)φi, (11)
which is positive (negative) if and only if βσ > (<)1. The last term of the RHS in
(7) is then
(β − 1
σ
)(φr − φp) ˙E/E.
3.6 Summary
A numerical example will help us understand the current exercise. Before that,
to recap, the per capita consumption discount rates for the current specific utility
function is, by substituting (10), (9) and (11),
ρ
pcc
i = δi −
˙Li
Li
+ (α(1 − β) + β − 1
σ
)
[
(1 − φi) c˙i
ci
+ φi
˙E
E
]
+
1
σ
c˙i
ci
(12)
in contrast to the benchmark conventional discount rate, ρ = δ + βc˙/c, or another
benchmark for aggregate consumption discount rate (Hoel and Sterner 2007),
ρ = δ +
[
(β − 1
σ
)(1 − φ) + 1
σ
] c˙
c
+ (β − 1
σ
)φ
˙E
E
.
If the nume´raire is the environment, its shadow price ∑i=r,p[Liu−αi e−δit∂ui/∂E] can
be shown to change according to
ρE =
∑
i=p,r
ψi
[
δi −
˙Li
Li
+ (α(1 − β) + β − 1
σ
)
[
(1 − φi) c˙i
ci
+ φi
˙E
E
]
+
1
σ
˙E
E
]
,
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where ψi =
Liu−αi e
−δit∂ui/∂E∑[Liu−αi e−δit∂ui/∂E] is, by analogy with the value share of the environment
φ, the “marginal welfare share” of the income group i = p, r. Using the per capita
consumption rate above, the environment discount rate is equivalent to
ρE =
∑
i=p,r
ψi
[
ρ
pcc
i −
1
σ
( c˙i
ci
−
˙E
E
)
]
.
This shows that the scarcity of the environment relative to consumption should be
deducted from the usual consumption discount rate, and that the weighted sum of
the residual rates is the correct environment discount rate.
To formalize the impacts of parameters on the disaggregated discount rates,
below are the derivatives of the discount rates with regard to selected parameters.
∂ρ
pcc
i /∂α = (1 − β)[(1 − φi)
c˙i
ci
+ φi
˙E
E
], (13)
∂ρ
pcc
i /∂β = (1 − α)[(1 − φi)
c˙i
ci
+ φi
˙E
E
], (14)
∂ρ
pcc
i /∂σ =
φi
σ2
(
˙E
E
−
c˙i
ci
). (15)
The partial derivative with regard to α is just u˙/u, since the parameter does not
appear in the other parts than the utility growth rate in (5). Note also that the
effect of α and β on the discount rates of i is symmetric if 0 < α, β < 1.
Now, let us rewrite the difference in ρpcci , (7):
ρpccr − ρ
pcc
p =(δr − δp) −
[ ˙Lr
Lr
−
˙Lp
Lp
]
+
[
α(1 − β) + β − 1
σ
][
(1 − φr) c˙r
cr
− (1 − φp) c˙p
cp
+ (φr − φp)
˙E
E
]
+
1
σ
[ c˙r
cr
−
c˙p
cp
]
(16)
It is straightforward to interpret the third term on the RHS of (16), the first bracket
of which can be re-arranged as [α(1 − β) + β − 1
σ
] = (1 − 1
σ
) − (1 − α)(1 − β), and
becomes negative if, say, α, β < 1 for the poor substitutability case (0 < σ < 1).
Whereas its sign is ambiguous when either α or β is more than unity.
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3.7 Examples
For simplicity, throughout the examples below, the pure rate of time preference
and the population growth rate are set equal between the two groups (δr = δp =
0.1% and ˙Lr/Lr = ˙Lp/Lp = 0.5%).
We first look at the case of different consumption growth rates (Figure 1).
We let α to be varied at 4, 2, 1, and -1. The other assumptions are: β = 2,
σ = 0.7, γ = 0.1, c˙r/cr = 1.3% (as is the average employed in Stern (2006]),
c˙p/cp = 0.65% and ˙E/E = 0.5% (i.e. environmental quality is growing at an
even slower pace than consumption of the poor), so that the cross elasticity ηcE is
positive. The initial level of consumption in the rich is 100 times higher than that
in the poor. The conventional Ramsey discount rate would read r = 2.7% in the
rich and r = 1.4% in the poor. The wedge of discount rates between the rich and
poor widens as time goes by, since the poor consumption growth rate is so low
to settle to the long-run discount rate. When inequality aversion is so strong as
α = 4, discounting of the rich, poor, and the environment are all negative for the
first century. The environment discount rate, which is actually negative, starts with
-0.5%, then gradually increases, and almost reaches 0% within the same period.
To focus on how the value share of the environment affects the divergence, let
us assume away the difference in the consumption growth, c˙r/cr = c˙p/cp = c˙/c,
corresponding to the Figures 2 and 3. In this case the discount rate wedge, (16),
is simplified as
ρpccr − ρ
pcc
p =
[(1 − 1
σ
) − (1 − α)(1 − β)](φr − φp)( ˙E
E
−
c˙
c
) (17)
Let the consumption growth rates for the rich and the poor equal to 1.3% and the
environmental growth 0.5%. And even so, the divergence of the two consump-
tion discount rates is not negligible especially from 20 years on, as is depicted in
Figures 2 and 3 (but eventually it disappears since the value share of the lower in-
come group catches up with the rich under equal consumption growth prospects).
Since all the other parameters are set equal between the two groups, this is trace-
able to the third term in the RHS of (16); and this term is amplified by previously
dismissed parameter of inequality aversion. Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 only
in that consumption growth rates are identical for the rich and poor, but the gap
of disaggregated discount rates is as huge as 1% for the case of strong inequality
aversion, α = 4. Figure 3 preserves most of the assumptions of Figure 2, but the
substitutability of consumption goods and the environment is as high as 1.3.
To sum up these examples, we note, among others, that different consumption
12
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Figure 1: Discounting when the initial levels of per capita consumption are differ-
ent (cr(0) = 100cp(0)) and per capita consumption prospect for the rich is higher
(c˙r/cr = 1.3%, c˙p/cp = 0.65%). The other parameters are: α = 4, β = 2, σ = 0.7,
γ = 0.1 and ˙E/E = 0.5%) for the top left, α = 2 for the top right, α = 1 for the
bottom left, and α = −1 for the bottom right.
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Figure 2: Discounting when the initial levels of per capita consumption are
different (cr(0) = 100cp(0)) but the prospects of consumption growth are the
same(c˙r/cr = c˙p/cp = 1.3%). All the other assumptions in Figure 1 hold: β = 2,
σ = 0.7, γ = 0.1, ˙E/E = 0.5% and α = 4 for the top left, α = 2 for the top right,
α = 1 for the bottom left, and α = −1 for the bottom right.
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Figure 3: Discounting with high substitutability between consumption and the
environment. As in Fig.2, the initial levels of per capita consumption are different
(cr(0) = 100cp(0)) but the prospects of consumption growth are the same(c˙r/cr =
c˙p/cp = 1.3%). The other parameters are: β = 2, σ = 1.3, γ = 0.1, ˙E/E = 0.5%
and α = 4 for the top left, α = 2 for the top right, α = 1 for the bottom left, and
α = −1 for the bottom right.
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growth rates widen the disaggregated discount rates, but the value share of the en-
vironment, teaming up with inequality aversion and elasticity of marginal utility,
drives the wedge even if the consumption growth rates are the same. In the latter
case, the gap is to be warranted for the transition period until the eventual conver-
gence. Much has been discussed on elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,
but how inequality aversion can be determined is not all that clear, which we turn
to in the next section.
4 Unknown Weighting to Determine Inequality Aver-
sion
Thus far, we have been proceeding the discussion as if all the parameter values are
to be given once we face a problem in practice. In practice, we can move forward
in the opposite direction with some parameters being left unknown, and see an
implication of an hypothetical decision to be revealed in the unknown parameters.
This is especially relevant in the current context since, in delineating (16), we have
seen that (in)equality aversion in our SWF boosts the difference in the discount
rates between the rich and the poor. However, we know nothing beforehand about
descriptively or normatively appropriate value of α, let alone the other ethical
parameters. In a classic literature in the theoretical and practical basis for project
evaluation, Dasgupta et al. (1972) proposed distributional weights be treated as
unknown. The role of the central planning officer, they argue, is to calculate the
switching value of the weight, placed on distributional considerations, and let
them see the implications of policy options they have to allocate to consumption
in the aggregate and that of the disadvantaged. This approach, by nature, has its
own limitation: it’s hard to identify what governs allocative decisions in reality.
In this section, we simply assume that all the parameter values but the parameter
in question are known.
In this section, we modify their example and reinterpret it in a dynamic con-
text of climate change policy to see how disaggregated discounting and inequality
aversion is applied. Their original problem is summarized in Table I. Assume
there are two agricultural projects for irrigation. Project A is to provide irrigation
for commercial agriculture, in which case society as a whole receives net benefit
of 5 and poor peasants obtain net benefit of 2. Project B is an irrigation for subsis-
tence agriculture, which gives society and peasants net benefits of 1 and 5, respec-
tively. The society as a whole wants to maximize the social profit V = B1 + ωB2,
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net aggregate consumption peasants’ consumption
Project A 5 2
Project B 1 5
Table I. The original problem of unknown weighting in a hypothetical cost-benefit
analysis in Dasgupta et al. (1972).
where B1 and B2 stand for net benefit for aggregate and for peasants and ω is a
weight on the consumption of peasants, which is presumably taken as unknown.
It will prove useful if we consider the enterprise as a mix of Project A and
Project B, each being allocated shares of a and (1−a). So the social profit becomes
(4− 3ω)a+ (1+ 5ω), which then leads to conditional, corner solution of a = 1 for
ω ≤ 4/3 and a = 0 for ω ≥ 4/3. In sum, if the social weight given to the poor is
roughly more than 1.33, the subsistence agriculture project should be employed.
We can depict iso-profit curves in a (B1, B2) plane for a given value of ω, on which
a new set of curves corresponding to this switching value of the weight, 4/3, can
be overdrawn. According to this sensible frame of discussion, rather than laying
down the law of a certain number as a normative weight, the planner should show
the political leadership implied weighting values for each project to be opted for.
The leadership would then know rather objectively how much significance she
would juxtapose if a project or the other is to be adopted.
Our natural extension here is to assume a modern central planning officer who
faces climate change, an intergenerational problem. Leave the numerical exam-
ples intact from the original problem, but net per capita social profit from Project
A is composed of 5 and 2, the former reaped by the (richer) future generations and
the latter by the poor in the contemporary (Table II)8. Likewise, net per capita so-
cial profit from Project B generates only 1 unit for future generation and 5 units
for the poor group at the current time. To simplify the two pillar strategies for
climate change, label the two recipient sectors as “mitigation” and “adaptation”
for convenience. The effect of mitigation is revealed in t years, whereas adapta-
tion is an approach that benefits the contemporary poor who live in the lowland
areas, deemed most vulnerable to climate change. The objective function of the
social planner is V = B1 + ωB2, where B1 is the net per capita social profit that
will arise to the rich in t years by the mitigation policy, and B2 is that to the poor
in the present generation by the adaptation policy. Note that both are expressed in
per capita consumption terms, as is the case for many social cost-benefit analyses.
8In this section we use net per capita social profit and per capita consumption interchangeably.
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mitigation (for the future rich) adaptation (for the current poor)
Project A 5 2
Project B 1 5
Table II. A problem of unknown weighting for climate change.
Finally, ω is an ex-ante unknown parameter.
By construction, per capita consumption of the mitigation sector, rather than
social welfare or utility, is the nume´raire (∂V/∂B1 = 1). In this problem we are
asked to compare the benefits of the two groups who live in different time and
space. In other words, this is a joint problem of intergenerational and intragen-
erational equity. To consider the benefits of the mitigation (i.e. rich) sector in
the future, we can simply use the discount rate of (5) for the rich. We turn to the
expression of the shadow price of the adaptation (i.e. poor) sector of the current
time. Since the shadow price of the per capita social profit to the mitigation sector
(the rich) in t years is normalized to unity, referring to the shadow price for de-
riving equation (5), the weight factor in V = B1 + ωB2 for this dynamic problem
becomes
ω =
Lp(0)
Lr(t)
[
up(0)
ur(t)
]−α
u
p
c (0)
urc(t)/(1 + δr)t
, (18)
which is the marginal rate of substitution (minus 1) of the consumption of the
future rich by the present poor. As we have seen above, opting for Project B
(adaptation) with a = 0 would mean that the planner must have set the weight
parameter ω as more than 4/3.
Taking the natural logarithm of the above equation for ω, which is set at the
switching value of 4/3, we have
ln(4/3) = (ln Lp(0) − ln Lr(t)) − α(ln up(0) − ln ur(t)) + (ln upc (0) − ln urc(t)) + t ln(1 + δr),
which reads as ln(4/3)  0.0025.
The other parameters and assumptions continue to hold from the previous sec-
tion: the population growth rate is 0.5% and the forecast of the per capita con-
sumption growth rate is 1.3% for the both regions. Regarding our ethical or nor-
mative parameters, let us assume the relative risk aversion β = .5 and the pure rate
of time preference for the rich, δr, equals .001 (0.1%) per annum. The parameter
attached to the environment, γ, is .1, so that the value share of the environment
also becomes .1 in the year 0. Then the switching value of inequality aversion
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α is computed as 3.14. Thus, for this specific numerical sample, α turns out to
represent equality aversion. It is difficult to determine an appropriate value for
inequality aversion ex-ante, but we can tell the political leadership governing both
worlds that the implied inequality aversion is such and such in this way.
5 Conclusion
In the literature of discounting and climate change, it is customary to discuss dis-
counting in terms of aggregate consumption. Consumption prospects in the future,
however, should be wide apart between, say, the wealthiest nations and the bot-
tom billion. Care for such a global distribution of income would lead to a move to
disaggregate consumption discount rates. In this paper, we go back to the draw-
ing board of social welfare function comprising the well-being of the rich and
that of the poor, and have derived several discount rates for different nume´raire.
The most refined of such may be per capita consumption discount rate, which is
comprised of utility discount rate, population growth, utility growth rate weighted
by inequality aversion parameter, consumption growth rate weighted by elasticity
of marginal utility, and environment growth rate multiplied by cross elasticity of
marginal utility. All these might contribute to a wide difference in the rates of
discount for the rich and the poor, from a global social planner perspective. Of
particular significance is the mixed effect of relative risk aversion, elasticity of
substitution, and inequality aversion. Furthermore, in this setting, one can treat
intergenerational and intragenerational equity in a seamless manner. We carried
on to assume a constant-elasticity-of-substitution and constant relative risk aver-
sion utility for each group to specify characteristics of disaggregated discounting.
Within the given framework, each of the above does make a difference between
the two rates in numerical examples.
As is the case for all the discussion going on around discounting, ethical pa-
rameters are hard to be determined, so they should be discussed with sensitivity
analysis in a reflective equilibrium manner. One potential way to do this was
shown in the last section with a practice of unknown weighting.
There remain some important research items on the plate. We have assumed
that the world can be divided simply into the rich and the poor, but in practical
application they can vary as time goes by. Furthermore, climate change policy
inherently involves income transfer among nations, which is not addressed in the
current paper. It is not clear in such circumstances how, and according to what, we
should disaggregate consumption and discounting. Another interesting issue that
19
arises from the current SWF is the order of aggregation and its effect on discount
rates.
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